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Abstract
We analyze price competition under a mixed duopoly with homogeneous products and
symmetric quadratic cost functions. We consider both the cases of domestic competitor (pri-
vate ﬁrm) and foreign competitor, and all timings of pricing-sequential price setting with pub-
lic leadership, sequential price setting with private leadership, and simultaneous price setting.
We arrive at the following main result: If the private ﬁrm is domestic, equilibrium price
under sequential price setting with private leadership may exceed that under the other cases.
If the private ﬁrm is foreign, such a price never appears at equilibrium.
JEL classiﬁcation: D43, L32
Key words: mixed duopoly, price competition, Stackelberg.
Introduction
Mixed oligopolies, where welfare-maximizing public ﬁrms compete against proﬁt-
maximizing private ﬁrms, are common in some of the advanced, developing, and transitional
countries. In many countries, the competition between public and private ﬁrms existed or
still exists in many industries such as energy (electric power and natural gas), ﬁnance (bank-
ing, mortgage, and life insurance), transportation (railroad, airline, and overnight-delivery),
telecommunications, education, and medical service1）. From the seminal work of De Fraja
and Delbono (1989), mixed oligopoly becomes one of the major topics in the theory of indus-
trial organization. Recently, mixed oligopoly has been discussed in terms of both domestic
competition and international competition. For example, Fjell and Pal (1996), Matsumura
(2003), and Lu (2006) considers the case of foreign competitors.
＊ Corresponding author. 3-10-2, Osawa, Mitaka-shi, Tokyo 181-8585, Japan. Phone: (81)-422-33-
3169. Fax: (81)-422-34-6982. E-mail: ogawaa@icu.ac.jp
＊＊Asia university. E-mail: kkato@asia-u.ac.jp
1） See the introduction section of Matsushima and Matsumura (2006) for the detailed example.
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Many of the works in mixed oligopoly consider quantity competition and deals with the
asymmetric linear cost function or the symmetric convex cost function2）. However, analyses
with regard to price competition are relatively fewer than that on quantity competition3）.
This paper tries to answer a part of left question.
In our analysis, we employ a model proposed by Dastidar (1995). He studies a price com-
petition with homogeneous product markets under private oligopoly. He demonstrates that
the equilibrium prices are continuous in a pure strategy, if the cost functions are symmetric
between both ﬁrms. We switch the model to mixed duopoly. In other words, this paper
analyzes the price competition in a homogeneous product market under a mixed duopoly. We
consider the case where cost functions are symmetric between two ﬁrms and they are strictly
convex4）. In our model, one private ﬁrm and one public (or privatized) ﬁrm exist. We consider
both cases wherein the private ﬁrm is domestic and foreign because foreign ﬁrms might play
a major role in some of the developing countries5）.
The private ﬁrm maximizes its own proﬁt. The public ﬁrm maximizes a weighted average
of social welfare and its own proﬁt6）. Since we are unsure about which ﬁrm is the ﬁrst-mover
in price competition7）, we compare three timings of price setting: (1) (timing S) wherein both
ﬁrms set those prices simultaneously. (2) (timing Pri) wherein the private ﬁrm sets its price
ﬁrst, followed by the public ﬁrm. We refer to this situation as “private price leadership.” (3)
(timing Pub) wherein the public ﬁrm sets its price ﬁrst, followed by the private ﬁrm. We refer
to this situation as “public price leadership.”
We demonstrate that the equilibrium price under S has a range regardless of the private
ﬁrm’s origin and it equals that proposed by Dastidar (1995), despite the public ﬁrm existing
in the market. We also ﬁnd that if the private ﬁrm is domestic, the equilibrium price under
2）Pal (1998) and Lu (2006) provide examples of the former setting. De Fraja and Delbono (1989) and
Delbono and Scarpa (1995) provide examples of the latter. Matsushima and Matsumura (2003)
provides an example of the other type of cost function.
3）For example, Anderson, de Palma, and Thisse (1997), Matsumura and Matsushima (2004) and
Ishibashi and Matsumura (2006) treat price competition. However, they consider diﬀerentiated
products. Cremer, Marchand and Thisse (1991) deals with a price competition with homogenous
products. However, in their model, each ﬁrm is diﬀerentiated by its location.
4）We employ a quadratic cost function.
5）We assume that the public ﬁrm is domestic.
6）For a rationalization of the objective, see Bos¨ (1991) and Matsumura (1998). Using such an
objective function, we can deal with several types of public ﬁrm.
7） In quantity competition, for example, Pal (1998) deals with the observable delay game in mixed
oligopoly.
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Pri is higher than that under Pub and may exceed the range of that under S under some
condition. On the other hand, if the private ﬁrm is foreign, such pricing does not occur. In
other words, if the competitor of the public ﬁrm is domestic, the existence of a public ﬁrm
may hamper social welfare. This implies that the origin of the competitor is quite important.
Even if the existence of public ﬁrms is justiﬁed by the reason of its objective of maximizing
social welfare, the government of a country would beneﬁt by limiting the primary role of the
public ﬁrm in the market until domestic industry takes oﬀ.
This paper comprises ﬁve sections. Section 2 builds the model. Section 3 solves the equi-
librium considering a domestic private ﬁrm. Section 4 analyzes the equilibrium with foreign
private ﬁrm. Section 5 concludes the paper. We note that Section 3 is based on Ogawa and
Kato (2006).
１．The Model
Suppose there is a homogeneous product market comprising one public ﬁrm (ﬁrm 0) and
one private ﬁrm (ﬁrm 1). The demand function is given by D(p) = a− p, where a is positive
and suﬃciently large. The cost function is given by cq2i , where c is positive and qi is the
output of ﬁrm i, i = 0, 1. We do not assume any ineﬃciency of the public ﬁrm.
We introduce the following assumptions8）:
Assumption
1. Firms have to supply the demand that they face9）.
2. When both two ﬁrms choose the same price, they share the demand equally, that is, when
they chooses the same price, p, each ﬁrm supplies 12D(p) respectively.
The proﬁts of ﬁrm i is given by
πi =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
pi(a− pi)− c(a− pi)2 if pi < pj ,
pi
{
1
2 (a− pi)
} − c{12 (a− pi)}2 if pi = pj ,
0 otherwise.
（1）
8）These assumptions are also considered in Dastidar (1997).
9）We note that our results are crucially depends on this assumption. Matsumura (2012) changes the
assumption to “only the public ﬁrm has to supply the demand it faces.” They analyse a mixed
duopoly with a domestic private ﬁrm (corresponding to section 3 of ours) and discuss for foreign
private ﬁrm (section 4 of ours). They show that ﬁrst best arises under the assumption, regardless
of the origin of the private ﬁrm.
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Domestic social welfare is given by
SW = consumer’s surplus + domestic producer’s surplus,
=
⎧⎨
⎩
1
2 (q0 + q1)
2 + π0 + π1, if ﬁrm 1 is domestic,
1
2 (q0 + q1)
2 + π0, otherwise.
（2）
The objective function of the public ﬁrm U0 and that of the private ﬁrm U1 are given by
U0 = θSW + (1− θ)π0, （3）
U1 = π1. （4）
where θ ∈ [0, 1] indicates the share of ownership by states. In other words,
• If θ = 1, the ﬁrm 0 is a purely public ﬁrm.
• If θ ∈ (0, 1), the ﬁrm 0 is a partially privatized ﬁrm10）.
• If θ = 0, the ﬁrm 0 is a perfectly privatized ﬁrm.
We consider the three types of the price competitions: simultaneous (S), sequential with
private price leadership (Pri), and sequential with public price leadership (Pub). We employ
the Nash equilibrium (at case “S”) or the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE; at cases
“Pri” and “Pub”) as the solution concept. In the following sections, we focus on the situa-
tion where each ﬁrm adopts pure strategies. We only consider the case pi ∈ [0, a] because the
equilibrium must be in this region if it exists.
２．Equilibrium with a Domestic Private Firm
First we derive the best response correspondence of each ﬁrm.
Lemma 1
1. The best response correspondence of ﬁrm 0 is given by
BRD0 (p1)=
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
a 2c+1−θ
2c+2−θ , if p1 > σ
D
1 , θ >
1
3 , and c ≥ 2(1−θ)
2
3θ−1 ,
p1 − , if p1 ∈
(
a (3−θ)c(3−θ)c+2(1−θ) , a
2c+1−θ
2c+2−θ
]
, and
⎧⎨
⎩
θ ≤ 13 ,
θ > 13 and c <
2(1−θ)2
3θ−1 ,
p1 + δ, if p1 < a
(1−3θ)c
(1−3θ)c+2(1−θ) and θ ≤ 13 ,
p1, otherwise,
10） To obtain the objective function for partial privatization, we follow Matsumura (1998).
■Price Competition in Mixed Duopoly with Increasing Cost Function
37
where σD1 = a
c(1 + θ) + 1− θ +
√
−θ3+2cθ2+3θ+2cθ−2
2c+2−θ
c(1 + θ) + 2
.
2. The best response correspondence of ﬁrm 1 is given by
BRD1 (p0) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
a 2c+12c+2 , if p0 > a
2c+1
2c+2 ,
p0 − , if p0 ∈ (a 3c3c+2 , a 2c+12c+2 ],
p0 + δ, if p0 < a cc+2 ,
p0, otherwise.
where δ (> 0) is arbitrary, and  (> 0) is suﬃciently small.
Proof. See Appendix A．
This lemma states the following:
• If the opponent ﬁrm sets a high price, the ﬁrm “undercuts,” i.e., sets a lower price and
take whole the demand.
• If the opponent ﬁrm sets a low price, the ﬁrm “pulls up,” i.e., sets a higher price and
supplies nothing.
• If the opponent ﬁrm sets a price not to be neither too low nor too high, the ﬁrm “follows,”
i.e., sets the same price so as to split the demand.
We note that the undercut incentive of the private ﬁrm is stronger than that of the public
ﬁrm. In other words, the private ﬁrm is more aggressive than the public ﬁrm because the
public ﬁrm considers the opponent’s proﬁts, whereas the private ﬁrm does not. On the other
hand, the pull up incentive of the private ﬁrm is also stronger than the one of the public ﬁrm.
Using this lemma, we have the following proposition.
Proposition 1 The equilibrium price is as follows:
1. If the price setting is simultaneous, the equilibrium price is continuous such that
pS,D0 = p
S,D
1 ∈
[
a
c
c + 2
, a
3c
3c + 2
]
.
2. If the price setting is sequential with private leadership, the equilibrium price is unique
such that
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pPri,D0 = p
Pri,D
1 =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
a
c + 1
c + 2
, if
⎧⎨
⎩
θ ≤ θ1, c ≥ c1,
θ > θ1, c ≥ c2,
a
c(1 + θ) + 1− θ +
√
−θ3+2cθ2+3θ+2cθ−2
2c+2−θ
c(1 + θ) + 2
, if θ > θ1, c ∈ [c3, c2),
a
(3− θ)c
(3− θ)c + 2(1− θ) , otherwise.
where θ1 =
√
17− 3
2
,
c1 =
2(1− θ)
1 + θ
,
c2 =
θ2 − 9θ + 2 +√θ4 + 14θ3 + 37θ2 − 4θ + 4
4θ
,
c3 =
2(θ − 1)2
3θ − 1 .
3. If the price setting is sequential with public leadership, the equilibrium price is unique such
that
pPub,D0 = p
Pub,D
1 =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
a
c(1 + θ) + 1− θ
c(1 + θ) + 2
, if c ≥ 2(1− θ)
1 + θ
,
a
3c
3c + 2
, otherwise.
（5）
Proof. See Appendix B．
The focus of the proposition is as follows:
• At the equilibrium, both ﬁrms sets the same prices, i.e., p0 = p1 regardless of the timing.
• The equilibrium price at private price leadership may exceed not only that at public price
leadership but also the range of the simultaneous price setting11）: this results from the
existence of a public or partially privatized ﬁrm12）.
The equilibrium price is not extremely high or low: If the price is extremely high, at least
one ﬁrm engages in undercutting. If the price is extremely low, at least one ﬁrm pulls up.
Thus, the equilibrium price is in the range where the opponent ﬁrm “follows.” This is the
driving force of the former point.
Since the public ﬁrm gives consideration to the private ﬁrm’s proﬁts, it has weak incentive
to “undercut.” Understanding this behavior, the private ﬁrm sets a high price at the sequential
11） If c < 2, a c+1
c+2
> a 3c
3c+2
.
12） If the public ﬁrm is perfectly privatized, the equilibrium price must not exceed the price range
appeared as the equilibrium under the simultaneous price setting.
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price setting with private leadership. This is the mechanism behind the latter point.
３．Equilibrium with a Foreign Private Firm
First we derive the best response correspondence of each ﬁrm.
Lemma 2
1. The best response correspondence of ﬁrm 0 is obtained by
BRF0 (p1) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
a 2c+1−θ2c+2−θ , if p1 > a
2c+1−θ
2c+2−θ ,
p1 − , if p1 ∈
(
a 3c3c+2 , a
2c+1−θ
2c+2−θ
]
,
p1 + δ, if p1 < a cc+2 ,
p1, otherwise.
2. The best response correspondence of ﬁrm 1 is given by
BRF1 (p0) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
a 2c+12c+2 if p0 > a
2c+1
2c+2 ,
p0 − , if p0 ∈ (a 3c3c+2 , a 2c+12c+2 ],
p0 + δ, if p0 < a cc+2 ,
p0, otherwise.
where δ (> 0) is arbitrary, and  (> 0) is suﬃciently small.
Proof. See Appendix C．
This lemma is similar to Lemma 1. However, the public ﬁrm facing foreign competitor has
more incentive to undercut and pull up as compared to the case where it faces domestic com-
petitor because the public ﬁrm does not take care of the foreign competitor’s proﬁts though
they consider domestic competitor’s proﬁts. Since the diﬀerence of the incentives between the
public and the private ﬁrm results from whether or not the ﬁrm considers the proﬁts of its
competitor, the incentives are symmetric between the ﬁrms unless the price is too high in the
case of foreign competitor13）.
Using this lemma, we have the following proposition.
Proposition 2 The equilibrium price is as follows:
13） This result is crucially dependent on assumption 1. The assumption guarantees that (1) the
consumer surplus does not change if a ﬁrm pulls up and (2) the consumer surplus is almost
unchanged if a ﬁrm undercuts marginally.
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1. If the price setting is simultaneous, the equilibrium price is continuous such that
pS,F0 = p
S,F
1 ∈
[
a
c
c + 2
, a
3c
3c+ 2
]
.
2. If the price setting is sequential with private leadership, the equilibrium price is unique
such that
pPri,F0 = p
Pri,F
1 =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
a
c + 1
c + 2
, if c ≥ 2,
a
3c
3c+ 2
, otherwise.
3. If the price setting is sequential with public leadership, the equilibrium price is unique such
that
pPub,F0 = p
Pub,F
1 =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
a
3c
3c + 2
, if c ≤ −4θ + 2,
a
c
c + 2
, if c ≤ 4θ − 2,
a
c− 2θ + 1
c− 2θ + 2 , otherwise.
Proof. See Appendix D．
Since the price range that satisﬁes BRFi (pj) = pj (i = j) is symmetric between the ﬁrms
in foreign competitor’s case, the equilibrium price at the sequential timing never exceeds the
range of equilibrium price at simultaneous timing. This result contrasts with the result shown
in Proposition 1.
Comparing both propositions, we have the following results:
• If the timing is simultaneous, the range of the equilibrium price shown at each proposi-
tion is identical because the incentives of the private ﬁrm to “undercut” and “pull up”
are binding.
• If the timing is sequential, the equilibrium price with the foreign private ﬁrm is no more
than the one with the domestic private ﬁrm.
As we mentioned after Lemma 2, the diﬀerence in the incentives between the ﬁrms is much
smaller in the foreign competitor’s case because the public ﬁrm does not give consideration
to the proﬁts of the private ﬁrm. Thus, the equilibrium prices with a foreign competitor at
sequential timings tend to be lower than those with a domestic competitor.
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４．Concluding Remarks
We analyzed three types of price competitions with homogeneous products and symmetric
quadratic cost functions under mixed duopoly. We have arrived at the following results:
• Both ﬁrms set the same price regardless of the timing to select their price.
• Both ﬁrms set the same price regardless of whether or not the private ﬁrm is domestic.
• If the timing is simultaneous, the equilibrium price exists continuously: if not, the equi-
librium price is unique.
• The equilibrium price under sequential price setting with private leadership may be higher
than that under simultaneous price setting, provided the private ﬁrm is domestic.
We have the following intuition from the results. Public enterprises are often justiﬁed by
the fact that they are conscious of social welfare and enhance it. However, even if they act
for the improvement of social welfare, their existence may lead to a worse outcome because
domestic private ﬁrms would exploit such a situation: Even if the domestic private ﬁrm sets
a high price, the public ﬁrm may hesitate to undercut because such an action might damage
the private ﬁrm and result in an increase total cost. Since the private ﬁrms understand this
situation, they sets a high price14）.
Therefore, monitoring the market price and market share is quite important. If the mar-
ket share of domestic competitors is high, the competition may be eased because of the public
ﬁrm’s behavior, and therefore, a highly marked-up price may be sustained. The government
should privatize the public ﬁrm when they encounter such a situation. Even in the developing
countries, the government should limit the activity of public ﬁrms until the domestic industry
takes oﬀ.
14） If the private ﬁrm is a foreign ﬁrm, the public ﬁrm never gives consideration to its proﬁts, and
thus, this situation should not occur.
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Appendix
A．Proof of Lemma 1
A．１ Best response correspondence of the public ﬁrm
First we consider the best response of ﬁrm 0. Substituting equation (1) into (3), we obtain
U0 =
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
V D0h , if p0 > p1,
V D0e , if p0 = p1,
V D0l , otherwise.
（6）
where
V D0h = θ
[
(a− p1)2
2
+ p1(a− p1)− c(a− p1)2
]
+ (1 − θ) · 0,
=
1
2
θ(a− p1)
[
2p1 + (1− 2c)(a− p1)
]
,
V D0e = θ
[
(a− p1)2
2
+ 2p1 · a− p12 − 2c
(a− p1
2
)2]
+ (1− θ)
[
p1 · a− p12 − c
(a− p1
2
)2]
,
=
1
4
θ(a− p1)
[
2p1 + (2− c)(a− p1)
]
+
1
4
(a− p1)
[
2p1 − c(a− p1)
]
,
V D0l = θ
[
(a− p0)2
2
+ p0(a− p0)− c(a− p0)2
]
+ (1 − θ)[p0(a− p0)− c(a− p0)2],
=
1
2
θ(a− p0)2 + (a− p0)
[
p0 − c(a− p0)
]
. （7）
Now, we intercompare V D0h , V
D
0e , and V D0l .
V D0h > V
D
0e ⇐⇒ 2θ(a− p1)
[
2p1 + (1− 2c)(a− p1)
]
> θ(a− p1)
[
2p1 + (2− c)(a− p1)
]
+ (a− p1)
[
2p1 − c(a− p1)
]
,
⇐⇒ p1 < a (1− 3θ)c(1− 3θ)c + 2(1− θ) ,
(
if θ <
1
3
)
. （8）
Thus, if ﬁrm 1 sets the price so as to satisfy the condition mentioned at (8), ﬁrm 0 sets
the higher price and supply nothing15）.
Comparison between V D0e and V D0l is a little more complicated than the one between V
D
0h
and V D0e because V
D
0l is not a given value but a function of p0. Thus, we must maximize V
D
0l
subject to p0 < p1 in order to compare them. Since
∂V D0l
∂p0
= 0 ⇐⇒ p0 = a2c + 1− θ2c + 2− θ , （9）
15） If θ ≥ 1
3
, V D0h ≤ V D0e ∀p1 ∈ [0, a].
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we have
max
p0<p1
V D0l =
⎧⎨
⎩
V D0l
(
a 2c+1−θ2c+2−θ
)
, if p1 > a 2c+1−θ2c+2−θ ,
V D0l (p1 − ), otherwise.
（10）
and
V D0l
(
a
2c+ 1− θ
2c+ 2− θ
)
=
a2
2(2c + 2− θ) ,
lim
→0
V D0l (p1 − ) =
(a− p1)(2p1 − 2ac+ aθ + 2cp1 − p1θ)
2
. （11）
Comparing them, we obtain16）
V D0l
(
a
2c+ 1− θ
2c+ 2− θ
)
> V D0e ⇐⇒
⎧⎨
⎩
p1 > σ
D
1 , if c ≥ (θ+2)(θ−1)
2
2θ(θ+1) ,
∀p1 ∈ [0, a], otherwise,
where σD1 = a
c(1 + θ) + 1− θ +
√
−θ3+2cθ2+3θ+2cθ−2
2c+2−θ
c(1 + θ) + 2
, （12）
lim
→0
V D0l (p1 − ) > V D0e ⇐⇒ p1 > a
a(3− θ)c
(3− θ)c + 2(1− θ) . （13）
We note that if θ > 13 ,
σD1
>
=
<
a
2c+ 1− θ
2c+ 2− θ ⇐⇒ c
>
=
<
2(θ − 1)2
3θ − 1 ,
a
(3 − θ)c
(3− θ)c + 2(1− θ)
>
=
<
a
2c+ 1− θ
2c+ 2− θ ⇐⇒ c
>
=
<
2(θ − 1)2
3θ − 1 , （14）
and
(θ + 2)(θ − 1)2
2θ(θ + 1)
<
2(θ − 1)2
3θ − 1 . （15）
If θ ≤ 13 ,
a
(3 − θ)c
(3− θ)c + 2(1− θ) <
a(2c + 1− θ)
2c + 2− θ （16）
always holds regardless of the c.
Hence, the best response correspondence is given by
16） We note that if c < (θ+2)(θ−1)
2
2θ(θ+1)
, V D0l
`
a 2c+1−θ
2c+2−θ
´ − V D0e = 0 has no real solution and therefore
V D0l
`
a 2c+1−θ
2c+2−θ
´
> V D0e .
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BRD0 (p1) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
a 2c+1−θ2c+2−θ , if p1 > σ
D
1 , θ >
1
3 , and c ≥ 2(1−θ)
2
3θ−1 ,
p1 − , if p1 ∈
(
a (3−θ)c(3−θ)c+2(1−θ) , a
2c+1−θ
2c+2−θ
]
, and
⎧⎨
⎩
θ ≤ 13 ,
θ > 13 and c <
2(1−θ)2
3θ−1 , （17）
p1 + δ, if p1 < a
(1−3θ)c
(1−3θ)c+2(1−θ) and θ ≤ 13 ,
p1, otherwise.
A．２ Best response correspondence of the private ﬁrm
Second we consider the best response of ﬁrm 1. Substituting equation (1) into (4), we obtain
U1 =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
V D1h , if p1 > p0,
V D1e , if p1 = p0,
V D1l , otherwise.
（18）
where
V D1h = 0,
V D1e =
[
p0 · a− p02 − c
(a− p0
2
)2]
,
=
1
4
(a− p0)
[
2p0 − c(a− p0)
]
,
V D1l = [p1(a− p1)− c(a− p1)2],
= (a− p1)
[
p1 − c(a− p1)
]
. （19）
Now, we intercompare V D1h , V
D
1e , and V D1l .
V D1h > V
D
1e ⇐⇒
1
4
(a− p0)
[
2p0 − c(a− p0)
]
< 0,
⇐⇒ p0 < a c2 + c . （20）
Thus, if ﬁrm 0 sets the price so as to satisfy the condition mentioned at (20), ﬁrm 1 sets
the higher price and supply nothing.
Comparison between V D1e and V
D
1l is a little more complicated than the one between V
D
1h
and V D1e because V D1l is not a given value but a function of p1. Thus, we must maximize V
D
1l
subject to p1 < p0 in order to compare them. Since
∂V D1l
∂p1
= 0 ⇐⇒ p1 = a2c + 12c + 2 , （21）
we have
max
p1<p0
V D1l =
⎧⎨
⎩
V D1l
(
a 2c+12c+2
)
, if p0 > a 2c+12c+2 ,
V D1l (p0 − ), otherwise,
（22）
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and
V D1l
(
a
2c + 1
2c + 2
)
=
a2
4(c + 1)
,
lim
→0
V D1l (p0 − ) = (a− p0)(p0 − ac + cp0). （23）
Comparing them, we obtain
V1l
(
a
2c + 1
2c + 2
)
> V D1e ⇐⇒ ∀p0 ∈ [0, a],
lim
→0
V D1l (p0 − ) > V D1e ⇐⇒ p0 >
a · 3c
3c + 2
. （24）
We note that a 3c3c+2 < a
2c+1
2c+2 . Hence, the best response correspondence is
BRD1 (p0) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
a 2c+12c+2 , if p0 > a
2c+1
2c+2 ,
p0 − , if p0 ∈ (a 3c3c+2 , a 2c+12c+2 ],
p0 + δ, if p0 < a cc+2 ,
p0, otherwise.
（25）
B．Proof of Proposition 1
B．１ Simultaneous price setting
Comparing BRD0 and BR
D
1 , we ﬁnd
a
(3 − θ)c
(3− θ)c + 2(1− θ) ≥ a
3c
3c+ 2
,(∀θ ∈ [0, 1], ∀c > 0),
a
(1 − 3θ)c
(1− 3θ)c + 2(1− θ) ≤ a
c
c + 2
,
(
θ ≤ 1
3
, ∀c > 0
)
. （26）
Hence, we directly obtain
pS,D0 = p
S,D
1 ∈
[
a
c
c + 2
, a
3c
3c + 2
]
. （27）
B．２ Sequential price setting with private leadership
The private ﬁrm maximizes V D1e subjected to the BR
D
0 (p1) = p1 because of the following
reason.
• If the private ﬁrm picks the price so that the public ﬁrm undercuts, π1(p1) = V D1h = 0.
• If the private ﬁrm chooses the price so that the public ﬁrm pulls up, π1(p1) = V D1l < 0
because a (1−3θ)c(1−3θ)c+2(1−θ) ≤ a cc+2 and thus V D1l
(
a (1−3θ)c(1−3θ)c+2(1−θ)
) ≤ V D1l (a cc+2) = 0.
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Since
∂V D1e
∂p1
= 0 ⇐⇒ p1 = ac + 1
c + 2
, （28）
the ﬁrm 1 sets price as follows:
p1 =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
a c+1c+2 , if BR
D
0
(
a c+1c+2
)
= a c+1c+2 ,
σD1 if BRD0
(
a c+1c+2
) = a c+1c+2 , θ > 13 , and c ≥ 2(1−θ)23θ−1 ,
a (3−θ)c(3−θ)c+2(1−θ) otherwise.
（29）
Now, we check whether the condition BRD0 (p1) = p1 deters from setting p1 = a
c+1
c+2 . Com-
paring a c+1c+2 with the upper bound of p which satisﬁes BR
D
0 (p) = p, we have
σD1 ≤ a
c + 1
c + 2
⇐⇒ c ≤ θ
2 − 9θ + 2 +√θ4 + 14θ3 + 37θ2 − 4θ + 4
4θ
,
a
(3− θ)c
(3− θ)c + 2(1− θ) ≤ a
c + 1
c + 2
⇐⇒ c ≤ 2(1− θ)
1 + θ
. （30）
We note that if θ =
√
17−3
2 , both conditions mentioned at (30) are the same: c ≤
√
17−3
2 . If
θ = c =
√
17−3
2 ,
σD1 = a
(3 − θ)c
(3− θ)c + 2(1− θ) = a
2c+ 1− θ
2c+ 2− θ , （31）
and we note that a (1−3θ)c(1−3θ)c+2(1−θ) < a
c+1
c+2 .
Hence, we have the equilibrium price as follows:
pPri,D0 = p
Pri,D
1 =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
a
c + 1
c + 2
, if
⎧⎨
⎩
θ ≤ θ1, c ≥ c1,
θ > θ1, c ≥ c2,
a
c(1 + θ) + 1− θ +
√
−θ3+2cθ2+3θ+2cθ−2
2c+2−θ
c(1 + θ) + 2
, if θ > θ1, c ∈ [c3, c2),
a
(3− θ)c
(3− θ)c + 2(1− θ) , otherwise,
（32）
where
θ1 =
√
17− 3
2
,
c1 =
2(1− θ)
1 + θ
,
c2 =
θ2 − 9θ + 2 +√θ4 + 14θ3 + 37θ2 − 4θ + 4
4θ
,
c3 =
2(θ − 1)2
3θ − 1 . （33）
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B．３ Sequential price setting with public leadership
The public ﬁrm maximizes V D0e subjected to the BR
D
1 (p0) = p0 because both SW and π0
are deteriorated if the private ﬁrm undercuts or pulls up.
• Social welfare SW is harmed if only one ﬁrm produced because of the cost function. Total
cost is minimized if both ﬁrms produce q2 in order to supply q.
• π0 = 0 if the private ﬁrm undercuts, and π0 < 0 if the private ﬁrm pulls up.
Since
∂V D0e
∂p0
= 0 ⇐⇒ p0 = ac(1 + θ) + 1− θ
c(1 + θ) + 2
, （34）
the ﬁrm 0 sets price as follows:
p0 =
⎧⎨
⎩
a c(1+θ)+1−θc(1+θ)+2 , if BR
D
1
(
a c(1+θ)+1−θc(1+θ)+2
)
= a c(1+θ)+1−θc(1+θ)+2 ,
a 3c3c+2 , otherwise.
（35）
Now, we check whether the condition BRD1 (p0) = p0 prevents from setting p0 = a
c(1+θ)+1−θ
c(1+θ)+2 .
Comparing a c(1+θ)+1−θc(1+θ)+2 with the upper bound of p which satisﬁes BR
D
1 (p) = p, we have
a
3c
3c+ 2
≤ ac(1 + θ) + 1− θ
c(1 + θ) + 2
⇐⇒ c ≤ 2(1− θ)
1 + θ
, （36）
and we note that a cc+2 < a
c(1+θ)+1−θ
c(1+θ)+2 .
Hence, we have the equilibrium price as follows:
pPub,D0 = p
Pub,D
1 =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
a
c(1 + θ) + 1− θ
c(1 + θ) + 2
, if c ≥ 2(1− θ)
1 + θ
,
a
3c
3c + 2
, otherwise.
（37）
C．Proof of Lemma 2
C．１ Best response correspondence of the public ﬁrm
First we consider the best response of ﬁrm 0. Substituting equation (1) into (3), we obtain
U0 =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
V F0h, if p0 > p1,
V F0e , if p0 = p1,
V F0l , otherwise.
（38）
where
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V F0h = θ
(a− p1)2
2
+ (1− θ) · 0,
V F0e = θ
[
(a− p1)2
2
+ p1 · a− p12 − c
(a− p1
2
)2]
+ (1 − θ)
[
p1 · a− p12 − c
(a− p1
2
)2]
,
=
1
2
θ(a− p1)2 + 14(a− p1)
[
2p1 − c(a− p1)
]
,
V F0l = θ
[
(a− p0)2
2
+ p0(a− p0)− c(a− p0)2
]
+ (1− θ)[p0(a− p0)− c(a− p0)2],
=
1
2
θ(a− p0)2 + (a− p0)
[
p0 − c(a− p0)
]
. （39）
Now, we intercompare V F0h, V
F
0e , and V F0l .
V F0h > V
F
0e ⇐⇒ 0 <
1
4
(a− p1)
[
2p1 − c(a− p1)
]
,
⇐⇒ p1 < a c
c + 2
. （40）
Thus, if ﬁrm 1 sets the price so as to satisfy the condition mentioned at (40), ﬁrm 0 sets
the higher price and supply nothing.
Comparison between V F0e and V
F
0l is a little more complicated than the one between V
F
0h
and V F0e because V
F
0l is not a given value but a function of p0. Thus, we must maximize V
F
0l
subject to p0 < p1 in order to compare them. Since
∂V F0l
∂p0
= 0 ⇐⇒ p0 = a2c + 1− θ2c + 2− θ , （41）
we have17）
max
p0<p1
V F0l =
⎧⎨
⎩
V F0l
(
a 2c+1−θ2c+2−θ
)
, if p1 > a 2c+1−θ2c+2−θ ,
V F0l (p1 − ), otherwise.
（42）
and
V F0l
(
a
2c + 1− θ
2c + 2− θ
)
=
a2
2(2c + 2− θ) ,
lim
→0
V F0l (p1 − ) =
(a− p1)(2p1 − 2ac + aθ + 2cp1 − p1θ)
2
. （43）
Comparing them, we obtain18）
V F0l
(
a
2c + 1− θ
2c + 2− θ
)
> V F0e ⇐⇒
⎧⎨
⎩
p1 > σ
F
1 , if θ ≥ 13 and c ≥ 2(θ
2−θ+2)
3θ−2 ,
∀p1 ∈ [0, a], otherwise,
17） We note that V F0l = V
D
0l because π1 = 0.
18） We note that if θ < 2
3
, V F0l
`
a 2c+1−θ
2c+2−θ
´−V F0e = 0 has no real solution and therefore V F0l
`
a 2c+1−θ
2c+2−θ
´
>
V F0e .
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where σF1 = a
c− 2θ + 1 +
√
3θ−2
2c+2−θ
c− 2θ + 2 , （44）
lim
→0
V D0l (p1 − ) > V D0e ⇐⇒ p1 > a
3c
3c+ 2
. （45）
We note that
σF1 − a
2c + 1− θ
2c + 2− θ = a
√
(3θ − 2)(2c + 2− θ)− (c + θ)
(2c + 2− θ)(c + 2− 2θ) < 0,
a
3c
3c+ 2
− a2c + 1− θ
2c + 2− θ = −a
c + 2(1− θ)
(3c+ 2)(2c+ 2− θ) < 0. （46）
Hence, the best response correspondence is given by
BRF0 (p1) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
a(2c+1−θ)
2c+2−θ , if p1 > a
2c+1−θ
2c+2−θ ,
p1 − , if p1 ∈
(
a 3c3c+2 , a
2c+1−θ
2c+2−θ
]
,
p1 + δ, if p1 < a cc+2 ,
p1, otherwise.
（47）
C．２ Best response correspondence of the private ﬁrm
The objective function of the private ﬁrm is the same at the both – domestic and foreign
– cases, although those of the public ﬁrm are not. Hence, the best response correspondence
is also the same as the one derived at appendix A．２ , i.e.,
BRF1 (p0) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
a 2c+12c+2 , if p0 > a
2c+1
2c+2 ,
p0 − , if p0 ∈ (a 3c3c+2 , a 2c+12c+2 ],
p0 + δ, if p0 < a cc+2 ,
p0, otherwise.
（48）
D．Proof of Proposition 2
D．１ Simultaneous price setting
Comparing BRF0 and BR
F
1 , we ﬁnd that the price range that a ﬁrm follows its opponent
price is the same between both ﬁrms. Therefore, obviously we obtain
pS,F0 = p
S,F
1 ∈
[
a
c
c + 2
, a
3c
3c + 2
]
. （49）
D．２ Sequential price setting with private leadership
The private ﬁrm maximizes V F1e subjected to the BR
F
0 (p1) = p1 because of the following
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reason.
• If the private ﬁrm picks the price so that the public ﬁrm undercuts, π1(p1) = V F1h = 0.
• If the private ﬁrm chooses the price so that the public ﬁrm pulls up, π1(p1) = V F1l < 0
because V F1l
(
a cc+2
)
= 0.
Since
∂V F1e
∂p1
= 0 ⇐⇒ p1 = ac + 1
c + 2
, （50）
the ﬁrm 1 sets price as follows:
p1 =
⎧⎨
⎩
a c+1c+2 , if BR
F
0
(
a c+1c+2
)
= a c+1c+2 ,
a 3c3c+2 otherwise.
（51）
Now, we check whether the condition BFD0 (p1) = p1 deters from setting p1 = a
c+1
c+2 . Com-
paring a c+1c+2 with the upper bound of p which satisﬁes BR
D
0 (p) = p, we have
a
3c
3c + 2
≤ ac + 1
c + 2
⇐⇒ c ≤ 2. （52）
We note that a cc+2 < a
c+1
c+2 .
Hence, we have the equilibrium price as follows:
pPri,F0 = p
Pri,F
1 =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
a
c + 1
c + 2
, if c ≥ 2,
a
3c
3c + 2
, otherwise.
（53）
D．３ Sequential price setting with public leadership
The public ﬁrm maximizes V F0e subjected to the BR
F
1 (p0) = p0 because both SW and π0
are deteriorated if the private ﬁrm undercuts or pulls up.
• Social welfare SW is harmed if only one ﬁrm produced because
– if the private ﬁrm undercuts, π0 damaged though consumer surplus is almost un-
changed19）.
– if the private ﬁrm pulls up, π0 damaged though consumer surplus is exactly the
same20）.
19） As we mentioned Appendix C．２, the optimal undercut for the private ﬁrm is p0−  and therefore
the increase of consumer surplus is negligible.
20） If the private ﬁrm pulls up, i.e., p0 < a
c
c+2
, V F0l < 0 and consumer surplus is not changed at all.
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• π0 = 0 if the private ﬁrm undercuts, and π0 < 0 if the private ﬁrm pulls up.
Since
∂V F0e
∂p0
= 0 ⇐⇒ p0 = ac− 2θ + 1
c− 2θ + 2 , （54）
the ﬁrm 0 sets price as follows:
p0 =
⎧⎨
⎩
a c−2θ+1c−2θ+2 , if BR
F
1
(
a c−2θ+1c−2θ+2
)
= a c−2θ+1c−2θ+2 ,
a 3c3c+2 , otherwise.
（55）
Now, we check whether the condition BRF1 (p0) = p0 prevents from setting p0 = a
c−2θ+1
c−2θ+2 .
Comparing a c−2θ+1c−2θ+2 with the upper bound of p which satisﬁes BR
D
1 (p) = p, we have
a
3c
3c+ 2
≤ ac− 2θ + 1
c− 2θ + 2 ⇐⇒ c ≤ −4θ + 2,
a
c
c + 2
≥ ac− 2θ + 1
c− 2θ + 2 ⇐⇒ c ≤ 4θ − 2. （56）
Hence, we have the equilibrium price as follows:
pPub,F0 = p
Pub,F
1 =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
a
3c
3c + 2
, if c ≤ −4θ + 2,
a
c
c + 2
, if c ≤ 4θ − 2,
a
c− 2θ + 1
c− 2θ + 2 , otherwise.
（57）
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